

Cuando el fascismo incumple sus promesas: las relaciones ambivalentes entre la Alemania nazi y la España franquista en el ámbito de la política social

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Resumen:

A través de tres estudios de caso (los intercambios de publicaciones periódicas, los viajes a Alemania de la Sección Femenina y el envío de trabajadores voluntarios), este trabajo busca ver si la cercanía ideológica entre la España franquista y la Alemania nazi también se verificó en el ámbito del trabajo y de la política social. Hubo intercambios reales e intensos entre los dos países, pero éstos disminuyeron a partir de 1942 por motivos diplomáticos y estrictamente nacionales, que a menudo resultaron más determinantes que los aspectos ideológicos. Las rivalidades internas y la cuestión del catolicismo impidieron la posibilidad de una transferencia clara y masiva del modelo y de las prácticas nazis, incluso en el seno de Falange.

Palabras-claves:

Política social, franquismo, Tercer Reich, transferencia de modelos

Abstract :

This paper tries to determine if tangible traces of the ideological kinship between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany can be found in the fields of social and labor policy. It is based on three case studies: the exchange of printed material, the organization of study trips to Germany and the sending of volunteer workers. If the cooperation between the Third Reich and Francoist Spain was certainly intense, it tended to diminish after 1942 due to diplomatic and local circumstances, which often took precedence on ideological sympathy. Indeed, internal rivalries and the place of religion often represented an obstacle to the massive transfer of Nazi principles and practices to Spain, even within the Falange.

Key words:

Work and Social Policy, Francoist Spain, Third Reich, exchange of ideas

**When Fascism Does Not Keep its Promises:
The Ambivalent Relations of Nazi Germany and Francoist Spain
in the Field of Work and Social Policy¹**

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„These exchanges of German, Italian and Spanish women have tightened the bonds of friendship and affection in a more lasting manner than diplomacy could have ever accomplished. They will serve to unite these three nations, which have set out on a crusade to defend our immemorial civilization, forever.“² This is how *Y*, the journal published by the Feminine Section of the Falange, described a trip made in 1937 by several of its members to study the NSDAP’s women and youth organizations. At the time, the interest and admiration for Hitler’s Germany was manifest within the fascist organization created by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. In the governing spheres of the Francoist camp, the ties with Hitler and Mussolini were close given that both leaders supported the coup against the Second Republic only two weeks into the Spanish Civil War, at the end of July 1936. It was their decisive backing, which entailed providing weapons, military personnel, diplomatic support and financial aid and allowed Franco to declare his complete victory over the Republicans on 1 April 1939. Between 1939 and 1942, the „New State“ was thus blatantly aligned on the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, even if it never officially join the pact signed in September 1940 and limited its official involvement in the Second World War to the sending of the *División Azul* on the Eastern front. This period corresponded to the moment when the Falange’s influence on the Francoist regime was the strongest. Franco’s own brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Súñer, worked relentlessly to build a stronger relation with Nazi Germany not only as head of the Falange but also as Foreign Secretary between 1940 and 1942. His replacement in September 1942 announced a subsequent change in Spanish foreign policy. Between 1943 and 1945, the Francoist regime adopted a neutral stance in a bid to guarantee its survival

¹ This work is part of the wider research project of a team of independent historians interested in the role played by the German Ministry of Labor under the rule of National Socialism. I am a member of a sub-committee led by Sandrine Kott and Kiran Pattel which focuses more specifically on the role played by the *Reichsarbeitsministerium* in the global promotion of Nazi Labor and Social policies.

² *Y: revista de la mujer nacional sindicalista*, n°1, 02/1938.

when the progress of the Allies made the defeat of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany inevitable. Regardless, it still shared with these „friendly nations“ a visceral form of anticommunism as well as a corporatist and vertical understanding of social organization³.

This paper will try to determine if tangible traces of the well-established ideological kinship between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany can be found in the fields of social and labor policy, which were key elements of Francoist propaganda⁴. Like numerous other European countries, Spain had expressed keen interest for the Bismarckian social model and had gradually started to build a welfare system of its own⁵. In the 1930s, this long-standing interest for Germany was amplified by the Falange“s fascination with the Nazi“s experiments in the organization of the masses as is demonstrated by the numerous study trips organized by its feminine section⁶. In a letter sent to the Labor Minister, Franz Seldte, the German ambassador to the Francoist camp clearly indicated that „the ruling classes of Nationalist Spain and of New Germany share[d] a common world-view, in particular on questions of social policy“⁷. This analysis is based on three case studies focusing on different channels of cooperation: the exchange of printed material, the organization of study trips to Germany and the sending of volunteer workers. It suggests that, if the cooperation between the Third Reich

³ In the very abundant bibliography on the topic one can single out: Walther L. BERNECKER, “Alemania y España en la época del nacionalsocialismo” en Henning WEGENER, Miguel Ángel VEGA CERNUDA (eds.), *España y Alemania. Percepciones mutuas de cinco siglos de historia*, Madrid, Editorial Complutense, 2000; Wayne H. BOWEN, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order*, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2000; David Wingeate PIKE, *Franco y el eje Roma-Berlín-Tokio: una alianza no firmada*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2010; Robert H. WHEALEY, *Hitler And Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2015.

⁴ Carme MOLINERO, *La captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista*, Madrid, Cátedra, 2005.

⁵ Michel DREYFUS (eds.), *Les assurances sociales en Europe*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009, p. 11.

⁶ Further readings on the Feminine Section: Karine BERGES, *Pilar Primo de Rivera (1906-1991) : cause féminine, idéologie phalangiste, stratégies et enjeux politiques dans l'ombre du régime franquiste*, thèse soutenue à l'Université de Lille en 2003; María Antonia FERNANDEZ JIMENEZ, *Pilar Primo de Rivera: el falangismo femenino*, Madrid, Síntesis, 2008; María Teresa GALLEGO MENDEZ, *Mujer, falange y franquismo*, Madrid, Taurus, 1983; Inbal OFER, *Señoritas in Blue: the Making of a Female Political Elite in Franco's Spain*, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2009; Kathleen RICHMOND, *Las mujeres en el fascismo español: la Sección Femenina de la Falange, 1934-1959*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2004.

⁷ Letter sent on 30 March 1938. *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (PA AA), RAV Madrid, 758, Sa.18.

and Francoist Spain was certainly intense, local circumstances often took precedence on ideological sympathy. For instance, references to Germany did not have the same meaning for social policy experts and Falangists. The former had worked on questions of social insurance during the inter-war years, had attended international conferences on the question and were familiar with the Bismarckian welfare system. The latter explicitly admired the Nazi organization of society but their achievements, in the end, were limited to public statements, propaganda stunts and isolated accomplishments. It is in this second network that the contacts with Nazi Germany were the most numerous yet, even here, they tended to diminish after 1942 due to diplomatic circumstances and to the polycratic nature of the regime. The internal rivalries between Falangists, Catholics, Monarchists and assorted military officers undoubtedly represented an obstacle to the massive transfer of Nazi principles and practices to Spain. In particular, the role to be conferred to religion in the Francoist State often represented a sticking point with Nazi ideologues, even in some segments of the Falange. Conversely, the Latin and Catholic identity of Italian Fascism was often viewed as a more promising model of what „New Spain“ should become.

This paper covers several fields of historical inquiry: the history of international relations, the history of social policy, the history of the Falange and more specifically of its Women’s Section. The genealogy of the relations between Nazi Germany and Francoist Spain has been tackled in previous studies, at times in a comparative perspective. Yet, the nature of these ties has never specifically been analyzed⁸. If the three case studies presented here do not open radically new fields of investigation *per se*, their confrontation is meant to focus attention more specifically on the diverse channels of communication and exchange which existed between these ideologically related regimes. For example, if the development of a Spanish welfare system has been precisely described in the past, the role played by pre-existing links with Germany has not specifically been considered. Similarly, the numerous studies which focus on the study trips made by members of the Women’s Section to observe

⁸ The relations of Spain and Germany in cultural matters have been more thoroughly described in studies of the Ibero-American Institute or of the Hispanic-German Society. Cf Reinhard LIEHR, Günter VOLLMER, *Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*, Vervuert, Frankfurt/Main, 2003; Maricó JANUÉ I MIRET, „Imperialismus durch auswärtige Kulturpolitik: die Deutsch-Spanische Gesellschaft als “zwischenstaatlicher Verband” unter dem Nationalsozialismus“, *German Studies Review*, 1 Feb. 2008, vol. 31, n° 1, pp. 109–32.

Nazi mass organizations⁹ or on the volunteer worker programs¹⁰ do not focus on the consequences that these initiatives might have had on the field of social policy. Diverse sources have been used in the writing of this paper: political archives (the records of the National Francisco Franco Foundation), government archives (the records of the German Ministry of Labor¹¹, the Permanent Interagency Committee for the Transfer of Workers to Germany¹² and the National Institute for Social Insurance¹³), diplomatic archives (the records of the German embassy to Spain), the archives of organisms affiliated to political parties (the records of the DAF¹⁴ and the Foreign Services of the Falange¹⁵) as well as several periodical publications (published by the Falange¹⁶, the Spanish Ministry of Labor¹⁷ or the INP¹⁸). First, the dense network of exchanges between Nazi Germany and Francoist Spain will be presented. Then the anatomy of Spanish-German relations, characterized in part by the fact that these ties were largely inherited, will be described. Finally, we will try to suggest the

⁹ These study trips have been thoroughly described by Toni Morant i Ariño; see for instance Antonio MORANT I ARIÑO, “‘In ehrlicher Kameradschaft’. Francistische Jugendführerinnen in Deutschland“, *Zeitschrift für Museum und Bildung*, 2006, n° 66, pp. 81-96.

¹⁰ Eric GOLSON, “Spanish Civilian Labor for Germany during the Second World War?“, *Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 2013, vol. 31, n° 1, pp. 145-70; Hartmut HEINE, “El envío de trabajadores españoles a la Alemania nazi, 1941-1945“, *Migraciones & Exilios: Cuadernos de la Asociación para el estudio de los exilios y migraciones ibéricos contemporáneos*, 2006, n° 7, pp. 9-25; Maricío JANUÉ I MIRET, “‘Woe Betide Us If They Win!’: National Socialist Treatment of the Spanish “Volunteer” Workers“, *Contemporary European History*, August 2014, vol. 23, n° 3, pp. 329-57; Rafael GARCÍA PÉREZ, “El envío de trabajadores españoles a Alemania durante la Segunda guerra mundial“, *Hispania: Revista española de historia*, 1988, vol. 48, n° 170, 1031-65; José Luis RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ, *Los esclavos españoles de Hitler*, Barcelona, Planeta, 2002.

¹¹ Located in the *Bundesarchiv* (BArch), Berlin.

¹² The documents of the *Comisión interministerial permanente para el envío de trabajadores españoles a Alemania* (CIPETA) are available in the *Archivo General de la Administración* (AGA), Alcalá de Henares.

¹³ The files of the *Instituto Nacional de Previsión* (INP) are located in the *Archivo General del Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria* (AINGESA), Madrid.

¹⁴ BArch.

¹⁵ AGA.

¹⁶ *Boletín informativo de la Delegación Nacional del Servicio exterior de la FET y de las JONS, Y: revista de la mujer nacional sindicalista*. Available at the *Biblioteca Nacional de España*, Madrid.

¹⁷ *Revista de trabajo*, available at the *Biblioteca del Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad social*, Madrid.

¹⁸ *Anales del Instituto Nacional de Previsión, Boletín de información – Caja Nacional de Seguros de Accidentes del Trabajo, Boletín de Información Extranjera, Previsión social* (AINGESA).

discrepancies which might have existed between an idealized official discourse and the reality of a vexed reception of the Nazi social „model“ in Spain.

I. Intense Exchanges between Two ‘Sister’ States

1. *Exchanging Information: Traditional Channels and Practices.*

As early as 1936, the *Informaciones Antibolcheviques*, a bi-monthly produced by the German propaganda office to promote national-socialist ideas, was published in Spain. Later on, these early efforts became more intense and systematic under the aegis of the Press Office of the city of Salamanca where both the military leadership of the Francoist camp and the German embassy were established¹⁹. Wilhelm Faupel, the German ambassador between February and October 1937, was asked to distribute in the Peninsula pamphlets in Spanish promoting the work that had been undertaken by the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* (RAD). Thus, in April 1937, 6 issues of the *Arbeitsmann* journal, 40 copies of the *Jahrbücher of the RAD* and 40 copies of a publication entitled *Der RAD in Wort und Bild* were shipped to the embassy²⁰. Similarly, in March 1938, Franz Seldte sent a memorandum on „social policies“ adopted in 1937 as well as an annual report in the hope that Faupel would circulate these documents throughout Spain²¹. For both the RAM (German Ministry of Labor) and the DAF producing a steady stream of periodical publications represented an efficient tool to circulate information and propaganda abroad.

In the field of social policy, the exchange of information between Spain and Germany certainly did not start with the Civil War: these practices were part of a well-established routine. If both the German and Spanish Ministries of Labor were responsible for producing publications which documented the adoption of new policies both at home and abroad, they did so not only for propagandist motives but also with an earnest desire to acquire a comprehensive understanding of social practices and experiments throughout the world. Thus,

¹⁹ Mercedes PEÑALBA-SOTORRÍO, “German Propaganda in Francoist Spain: Diplomatic Information Bulletins as a Primary Tool of Nazi Propaganda”, *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies*, 4 Feb. 2013, vol. 37, n° 1, p. 47.

²⁰ Letters from Müller-Brandenburg to Faupel, 2 and 14 Apr. 1937. PA AA, RAV Madrid, 759, Sa.18.

²¹ Letter dated 20 March 1938, *ibid.*

between April 1940 and March 1941, the *Sozialpolitische Weltrundschau* featured several articles on Spain evoking the construction of new housing projects, the level of unemployment or the adoption of new laws on labor legislation and pensions²². These articles, which were mostly based on the *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, summarized the main points of legal texts adopted in Spain. These informative articles suggest at best indirectly that this „new Francoist social order“ was being adopted by a „sister“ State²³. Ideological considerations were thus mainly absent, except in the accounts offered by the *Sozialpolitische Weltrundschau* of several speeches made by the Caudillo. Similarly, the technocrats of the RAM abstained from using the rhetoric of the regime. For example, they did not hold the „Reds“ responsible for the destructions incurred by the Civil War as was the case in Francoist propaganda²⁴.

Spanish institutions monitored foreign publications and tried to circulate their own documentation abroad in particular via the National Institute for Social Insurance (INP) which had been responsible for setting up most Spanish social policy programs of the beginning of the 20th century. The mission of its Foreign and Cultural Division was to „study international legislation and programs pertaining to all aspects of social policy“, „to exchange books, pamphlets and periodical“ with foreign institutions, „to promote the Spanish welfare system“ and to organize the participation of Spaniards to international conferences on these subjects²⁵. Thus, in 1944, the Division had working relations with a dozen German institutions including the RAM, the National Federation of Health Insurance Providers, the National Union of Professional Mutual Insurance Providers and had also subscribed to 111 international periodicals including a number of German publications²⁶.

The content of these publications, which reflected the „intense interest of all nations for matters pertaining to social policy“²⁷, allows us to quantify the interest of Francoist Spain for the Third Reich. In the *Labor Review*, about 30 articles were dedicated to policies

²² *Sozialpolitische Weltrundschau* (hereafter *SW*), issues 1, 10, 11 et 12.

²³ *SW*, n°1, Apr. 1940-Mar. 1941, p. 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁵ Article 26 of the “Bylaws of the central services of the INP” approved on 12 Jun. 1940, AINGESA.

²⁶ Manuel MAESTRO, *Los seguros sociales en España*, Madrid, Publicaciones del INP, 1944, p. 114.

²⁷ *Boletín de Información Extranjera*, 1945.

implemented by the Reich between 1939 and 1945, whereas there were only a dozen about Fascist Italy. A study produced by the INP in 1941 similarly analyzed in detail the social insurance systems adopted by other „totalitarian States“²⁸. Yet, if there was a genuine interest for Nazi policies between 1939 and 1941, this interest dwindled significantly between 1942 and 1943. This trend can clearly be correlated to the evolutions of Francoist foreign policy: it is at the same period that the Spanish government announced that it was a „neutral and expectant“ country before adopting, in January 1944 and in spite of German protest, the position of a „strictly neutral“ nation more favorable still to the Allies. In 1944 and 1945 one cannot find any articles evoking the situation in Germany. Similarly, in the *Foreign Information Bulletin* published by the INP, the number of articles dealing with Italy and Germany, mostly drawn from the *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, decreased regularly between 1943 and 1945. Thus, as early as 1943-44, the authors turned more and more frequently towards other Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. In accordance with Franco’s explicit demands, a complete translation of the Beveridge Report was prepared by the documentary services of the INP²⁹. The relations between Spain and Latin America became more important as well: references to Costa Rican public health policies, to Peruvian welfare programs or to benefits of Brazilian seamen became more and more frequent. Even if the Civil War had ended only a couple years earlier, the Falange’s fascination for the new dawn rising in the East, in Germany, was already a distant memory in the mid 40’s.

2. The Falangists’ Trips to Germany: ‘New Spain’s’ Fascination with Nazism.

Even before the end of the Civil War, the Francoist camp started laying the groundwork for its Catholic, corporatist and national-unionist State. Its main architect was Serrano Súñer: Franco supported fully his policy during the two years after the Civil War, from 1939 to 1941, by declaring that „nationalistic Spain [would emulate] the organization of totalitarian regimes, like Germany and Italy“³⁰. Consequently, in July 1939, numerous sub-sections modeled on those of Fascist parties were created within the Falange: a foreign press and propaganda

²⁸ Pedro ARNALDOS JIMENO, *Los seguros sociales en los estados totalitarios*, Madrid, INP, 1941.

²⁹ *Traducciones, C.P. 19-5-43*, AINGESA.

³⁰ Enrique MORADIELLOS, *La España de Franco (1939-1975) Política y sociedad*, Madrid, Síntesis, 2000, pp. 46-70.

service, youth organizations, labor organizations, *Auxilio Social* ³¹ ... The founder of the Women's Section, Pilar Primo de Rivera, aimed to give a firm legal existence to the organization within the structures of the new Francoist State looking for inspiration in the organizational structures adopted by „sister States“ like Germany, Italy or Portugal. This is why, between 1937 and 1943, the Women's Section organized about thirty study trips abroad for key members of its leadership. Pilar Primo Rivera herself travelled to Germany on numerous occasions and even met Hitler to whom she offered „a dagger and a sword forged in Toledo“³².

Militants travelled to the Third Reich „to watch and learn“³³: they visited primary and secondary schools, universities and administrative training centers; they also attended artistic and athletic events and were even present at the congress of the NSDAP in Nuremberg which made a very strong impression on them³⁴. In November 1937 ten Falangists were given the honor to meet Goebbels and to discover programs such as the *Amt für Schönheit* or *Kraft durch Freude*. Even if it was claimed at the time that these study trips represented „an exceptionally profitable and valuable experience both for Germany and the New Spain ambitioned by the Falange“, they were more one-sided in practice given that few if any Nazi leaders travelled to the Peninsula in return³⁵. The Women's Section played a leadership role in the organization of many of these trips, in collaboration with its German counterparts the *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft* (NSF) and the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM). To be truly successful, these exchanges had to be supported by the interpersonal relations of a handful of cultural „brokers“ who wished to establish much closer ties with the Third Reich. Clarita Stauffer, who was of German extraction and acted as the adjunct responsible for press and propaganda in the Falange's governing body, had prominent portraits of Franco, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Hitler and Mussolini in her office. Carmen de Icaza, the daughter of a Mexican diplomat, had grown up in Germany and was fluent in German. She played a

³¹ A periodical entitled *Alegría y Descanso* is even modelled on a similar German publication of the *Kraft durch Freude* program, *Freude durch Arbeit*. Cf letter written on 16 Mar. 1941 by the services of the German Embassy in Spain, PAAA, R99022.

³² “Pilar Primo de Rivera en Alemania”, *Y*, n°4, May 1938.

³³ Antonio MORANT I ARIÑO, *art cit.*, 2008, p. 3.

³⁴ “Viaje a Alemania”, *Y*, n°11, Dec. 1938.

³⁵ Letter sent by the German Ambassador to Dr. Kirchhoff, member of the *Deutsch-Spanische Gesellschaft*, 03/20/1937. PA AA, RAV Madrid, 759, Sa. 20 c.

leadership role in the *Auxilio Social*, a Falangist charity which was quite well-known in the Reich³⁶. She gave three conferences on the role of women in the Third Reich and stayed several months in Germany³⁷.

But what particular aspects of the Nazi „model“ attracted these Falangists and, more broadly, the leaders of „New Spain“? Pilar Primo de Rivera claimed to feel „immense sympathy and admiration“ for the Third Reich as did many other militants who shared similarly laudatory accounts of their stays in Germany³⁸. The feminine ideal of Francoism seemed embodied by a young militant of the *BDM*: „a vigorous and fit young girl who not only can jump 9 feet long and 3 feet high but has also learnt to cook, to sign, to read and to cover her books“³⁹. To put it in a nutshell, for the Falangists „Germany was an example that needed to be emulated“. But they also acted so for contingent political reasons. By foregrounding the bonds of the Women’s Section with Germany, Pilar Primo de Rivera aspired to give more importance to her organization within the rebel camp. Similarly Germany hoped to send a political message to the world that it had lost none of its international prestige even as the possibility of a victory in the Second World War became more remote. In January 1938 Hans Kröger, the director of the German *Sonderstab* in Salamanca, was thus pleased to underline the German superiority announcing to his superiors that a delegation of the Women’s Section had just returned from Italy and that it had learned nothing that could be transposed to Spain since it had spent most of its stay visiting fascist palaces and ornately decorated *case del popolo*⁴⁰.

3. Francoism, Labor and Social Justice.

When the Civil War broke out, Spanish social policies seemed thoroughly antiquated when compared to those of the rest of Europe. More than three decades after the adoption of the first bill establishing the employer’s responsibility in work related accidents (1900), the

³⁶ *SW*, n°2, Apr. 1941-Mar. 1942, p. 16.

³⁷ María Beatriz DELGADO BUENO, *La Sección Femenina en Salamanca y Valladolid durante la Guerra Civil. Alianzas y rivalidades*, PHD, Salamanca University, 2009, <http://gredos.usal.es/jspui/handle/10366/76225>.

³⁸ *Y*, n°45, Oct. 1941.

³⁹ Antonio MORANT I ARIÑO, *art cit.*, 2008, p. 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

majority of laws adopted were non-binding and applied only to the lowest classes of industrial laborers⁴¹. The Second Republic (1931-1939) had attempted to „unify all systems of social insurance“ under the aegis of the INP⁴². However, the ambition of the Minister of Labor, Francisco Largo Caballero, to create a unified and mandatory welfare system which would cover both industrial and agricultural workers never came to fruition⁴³.

After the Civil War, the Francoist regime wanted to restore a more traditional kind of social organization by promoting charitable organizations and benevolent societies rather than a real welfare system. Until the late 1950's, benefits and coverage were funded by employers and employees rather than by the State and varied widely from one sector to the next. This system, which was based on a vertical organization of the economy, functioned as a synthesis of the catholic and fascist models of corporatism. Adopted in 1938, the *Fuero del Trabajo* was clearly influenced by the Italian *Carta di Lavoro*. It instituted vertical unions which represented both employers and employees (thus *de facto* banning any form of collective bargaining) under the aegis of the State⁴⁴. Membership to unions which did not participate in the Federation of Spanish Unions (FSU) controlled by the Falange was forbidden, in a bid to control the working classes which had already been decimated by the war and the subsequent political repression. Finally, since only the Ministry of Labor was habilitated to define the working conditions in all sectors of the national economy, collective action became impossible⁴⁵.

Within this very restrictive legal framework strictly enforced by the Falange, a few very limited social rights were nevertheless granted to workers (family allowances in July 1938, pensions and disability insurance in 1939, mandatory health insurance in December 1942). However, the adoption of these isolated measures contradicted the very different understanding of social policy promoted by the National Institute for Social Insurance (INP).

⁴¹ Ana Marta GUILLÉN RODRÍGUEZ, “Un siglo de previsión social en España”, *Ayer*, 1997, n° 25, pp. 151-78.

⁴² Mercedes SAMANIEGO BONEU, *Hacia la unificación de los seguros sociales: el intento integrador de la II República*, <http://gredos.usal.es/jspui/handle/10366/79946>, 1984, pp. 104-7.

⁴³ L.M. FERNÁNDEZ et S.S. URDIOLA, “Génesis y desarrollo del Estado del Bienestar en España”, *art cit.*, pp. 7-9.

⁴⁴ Pedro Carlos GONZÁLEZ CUEVAS, *Historia de las derechas españolas: de la Ilustración a nuestros días*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2000, pp. 9-11.

⁴⁵ *Ley de reglamentaciones de trabajo*, 16 Oct. 1942.

This organism controlled by the Ministry of Labor promoted the creation of a unified welfare system covering a wide range of risks and employees, structured around a single treasury, a centralized management and rationalized administrative procedures. When the Falangist José Antonio Girón de Velasco became Labor Minister, in May 1941, a struggle to know who would control the State's monopoly over social policy started to oppose the INP, influenced by the social justice movement of the Catholic Church, to the Federation of Unions controlled by the Falange. The fact that some of the prerogatives of the former were transferred to the latter led to a certain degree of disorganization and to a clear loss of effectiveness amplified by the regular reduction of state budgets⁴⁶.

In the beginning of the 1940's, the question of how tight the bonds with the Third Reich in the field of labor were was similarly raised by the volunteer workers program. In December 1941, the *Bulletin* of the Falange's Delegation of Foreign Services gave an account of the departure of a special train chartered to bring a contingent of 570 Spanish workers to Germany. The Labor Minister, who attended the event, stressed the fact that these workers had „benefited of very favourable conditions in their recruitment by German firms, identical to those of the workers of the Reich and of the DAF“⁴⁷. This rhetoric was tailored to encourage the Spanish population to participate in the program in mass given that the Third Reich's needs in terms of work-force had increased considerably in the early 40s. On 3 September 1941, in compliance with an agreement signed by Germany and Spain on 22 August, the Permanent Interagency Committee for the Transfer of Workers to Germany (CIPETA) was created⁴⁸. The aim was not only to pay back the 480 million Deutsch Marks debt contracted by Spain during the Civil War but also to tighten the bonds between both States and put a lid on the massive unemployment rates that were rampant throughout Spain⁴⁹. The director of the CIPETA was chosen by the Spanish Foreign Secretary with the help of his technical advisors but was designated by the Ministry of Labor, thus guaranteeing the

⁴⁶ The insurance program for forced unemployment, managed by the INP, was abandoned in 1944 for instance when the Union Charity Against Unemployment was created. Cf Arturo ÁLVAREZ ROSETE, „¡Bienvenido, Mister Beveridge!“ El viaje de William Beveridge a España y la Previsión Social Franquista”, *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 1 Sep. 2004, vol. 17, n° 2, pp. 113-14.

⁴⁷ *Merkblatt für ausländische Arbeitskräfte*, 1942, R3901/20288a, BArch.

⁴⁸ 'Decreto por el que se crea una Comisión interministerial permanente para el envío de trabajadores españoles a Alemania, en cumplimiento del Acuerdo hispano-alemán', *BOE* n°248, 5 Sep. 1941.

⁴⁹ José Luis RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

Committee's loyalty to the Falange. Both the RAM and DAF were represented in the governing body of the committee. Its mission was to organize the recruitment of workers, to insure that they were both fit and able for service, to equip them and to transfer them to the French border. According to the terms of the 1941 agreement, Spain was expected to provide 100 000 volunteers to Germany but only 4 200 workers had been sent by December 1941 and, at peak of its activity, no more than 10 596 volunteers worked in the Third Reich. Indeed, after 1943, as the Axis started to lose ground in Europe, the Allies exerted more and more pressure on the Spanish government to reduce its support to Hitler's Germany to a minimum⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-8.

II. ‘Heil Hitler! ¡Arriba España!’⁵¹: Anatomy of a Relationship.

1. *The German Perspective: Spain as One Country amongst so Many Others.*

In spite of numerous laudatory statements celebrating the privileged relationship with „one of the allied nations of the Reich“⁵², the archives of RAM do not suggest that any specific propaganda efforts were directed towards the Francoist State. The *Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz* (GBA) did have a representative (*‘Beauftragte’*) in Madrid but the Reich seemed to have turned to Spain only to alleviate its increasingly problematic labor shortage⁵³. In this respect, the difference with Fascist Italy was striking. Indeed, in December 1939, the RAM argued that the Reich might reinforce its leadership role in the field of social policy by creating a „small intergovernmental structure“ with countries which shared the same ideological vision as Germany. If Italy was explicitly mentioned as a country which „shar[ed] the same understanding of social policy as Germany“, Spain was not. Thus, the Nazis seemed to perpetuate the long-standing German practice of considering social policy as an „export commodity“ (*„Ausfuhrartikel’*) which would enable Germany to maintain its presence on the international stage and to extend its global influence⁵⁴.

What little propaganda efforts the RAM did direct towards Spain often led the Ministry of Labor to compete with other institutions such as the DAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As far as the transfer of volunteer Spanish workers was concerned, the distribution of duties between the RAM and the DAF seemed relatively clear: the former recruited workers which were adapted to the needs of German firms whereas the latter supervised these workers once they had arrived in the Reich⁵⁵. However, the relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed far more complex, ambivalent and unstable: they ranged from the need to

⁵¹ Letter sent by Jutta Rüdiger to Pilar Primo de Rivera on 3 Jul. 1941 and excerpted from José María ZAVALA, *La pasión de Pilar Primo de Rivera*, Barcelona, Plaza & Janés, 2013, p. 244.

⁵² Letter from the *Justizrat* Herold to the director of the Special Delegation in Berlin, 18 Jan. 1945. (14)001/018, 75/23389, AGA.

⁵³ Bill creating the *GBA* (27 Mar. 1942, RGB. I S. 130); bill n°4 / *GBA* (7 May 1942). R3901/20471, BArch.

⁵⁴ Document written on 28 Dec. 1939, R3901/20653, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ „*Solicitud del RAM para la obtención de mano de obra industrial*“, (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA.

collaborate to further common goals to outright rivalry. The RAM had no qualms about systematically mobilizing the resources offered by the embassies and the consulates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asking them to publicize information about the social policies of the Third Reich⁵⁶. That being said, each Ministry remained steadfast in the defence of its prerogatives and, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered that it alone could determine the relevance and intensity of exchanges with foreign youth organisations⁵⁷.

2. The Spanish Perspective: Perpetuating Inherited Forms of German-Spanish Collaboration on Social Policy.

The publications produced by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and the INP demonstrate that, before the Francoist regime found itself increasingly isolated on the international scene and turned to autarkic reflexes in 1945, most actors spontaneously looked abroad to find solutions to domestic problems pertaining to social policy. In the *Labor Review* one mostly finds relatively austere articles which are mostly free of ideological considerations. These factual texts crammed with data represented a toolbox of sorts for administrators and technocrats. For instance, in the summer of 1939, the organization and operations of the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* were meticulously described and the 27 articles of the law adopted on 26 June 1935 were translated⁵⁸. Most of the signed articles on Germany were written by a single author, Federico López Valencia. Already in place in the 1920's, he had been frequently sent abroad to attend international conferences on public housing in London, Amsterdam, New York, Vienna, Paris and Rome. After the Civil War, Federico López Valencia was perceived as a civil servant that the Ministry of Labor of the „New State“ could not do without: his extensive knowledge of the transnational networks of mobility and exchange of the inter-war years made his expertise particularly valuable. He was thus one of the experts who were interested in the traditional German social model rather than in that of the Third Reich.

⁵⁶ For instance, letter sent to the German Embassy in Spain, 14 Nov. 1936, 758, Sa.18, PA AA.

⁵⁷ Letter sent to the Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, 14 Dec. 1937. 759, Sa.20b: *Nationalsozialismus, Organisation, Besuche, ibid.*

⁵⁸ “Una realización del nacionalsocialismo. El servicio de trabajo alemán”, *Revista de trabajo*, n°1, Jul.-Aug. 1939.

It is similarly enlightening to consider the careers of the civil servants who piloted the INP, an organism which had been traditionally dominated by sociologists and economists from the centre-right and the catholic social justice movement. In 1940, its personnel was not composed of new men: most of these academics had law degrees and had been working on questions of social policy reforms for years explaining why their political affiliation to the Francoist regime could, at times, be motivated merely by an opportunistic desire to preserve their prominent position⁵⁹. José Maria Zumalacárregui Prat (1878-1956), who was the second vice-president of the INP in 1940, was an economist who had attended the International Labor Conference of Geneva in 1935⁶⁰. After the military coup of July 1936, he clandestinely joined the Francoist faction and integrated its Welfare Division. Yet, the work habits of these kind of individuals, who all had relatively conservative pedigrees and were used to participating in international networks and institutions during the inter-war period, remained largely unchanged by the War. Their „professional enthusiasm for the question of international health policy [thus] appeared to transcend political boundaries“⁶¹.

These examples tend to corroborate the hypothesis that most of the ties which can be identified between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany had actually already been in place in the early 30's. The Falange might represent an exception to this but we will evoke their case at length later on. We would now like to examine how the German social model was received, adapted and even criticized in the Iberian Peninsula.

III. From Theory to Practice: the Inconsistent Transfer of the ‘Nazi Model’ to Spain.

1. Speaking a Common Language.

The fascination for the Third Reich of certain elements of „New Spain“ and, more generally, the interest of certain social policy experts for the German model raised very practical linguistic problems. Regardless of the ideological propinquities existing between both countries, the political and scientific staff had to be able to communicate in both

⁵⁹ *Boletín de información – Caja Nacional de Seguros de Accidentes del Trabajo*, n°1, 1940.

⁶⁰ Rocío SÁNCHEZ LISSEN, *Economía y Economistas Andaluces: Siglos XVI al XX*, Madrid, Ecobook, 2013.

⁶¹ David BRYDAN, “Axis Internationalism”, *art cit.*, 291, pp. 9 and 310.

languages. Interpreters were the keystone of all exchanges of information and individuals between Germany and Spain; however, one finds very few mentions of these actors in the archives and the importance of their role can only be evaluated when their absence became a problem for authorities. Spanish volunteers sent to Germany were not always able to sign contracts drawn up in their mother tongue and were thus often unable to understand all of their clauses⁶². In the camps where they lived and the factories where they toiled, workers did not always have access to the services of an interpreter which could cause serious misunderstandings with the German workforce and management. Cases have been documented in which Spanish workers, angered to have received a smaller salary than expected (due to payroll taxes that did not exist in Spain), complained directly to their German employers. Attempting to express their grievances in Spanish with the help of exuberant gestures, which seemed threatening to their interlocutors, they were often simply and unceremoniously dismissed⁶³.

If speaking a common language was a precondition to the successful transfer of any model, sharing a common political and administrative culture proved similarly decisive. In the present case, it was the personnel working at the interface of both social policy systems which had to undertake this necessary but fastidious task of education and translation. For instance, an employee of the German embassy had to explain to his interlocutor in Berlin that „the relation between the single union and the Falange is more or less similar to that existing between the NSDAP and the DAF“⁶⁴. Similarly wages were not calculated in the same manner in Germany and Spain, a „cultural“ difference which the secretary of the CIPETA felt he had to explain to other Spanish actors⁶⁵. Mandatory deductions on wages represented a sizeable burden, particularly for single men (up to 25% of the daily wages), which often forced volunteers to work overtime if they wanted to send money back to their families⁶⁶. This one example of the numerous legal conundrums raised by the transfer of workers to Germany yet one should not overlook, as well, the innumerable practical problems that these transfers generated mostly with regards to working and living conditions.

⁶² Bill n°4 / GBA (7 May 1942), R3901/20471, BArch.

⁶³ Report of an inspection made in the Vienna-Linz zone (Austria), 25 Aug. 1942. (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA.

⁶⁴ „*Vermerk*“ written on 12 Jan. 1937. 759, Sa.21: *Falange Española*, PA AA.

⁶⁵ Letter from the secretary of the CIPETA to the Ministry of Labor, 16 Apr. 1942, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Special Delegation in Berlin, 19 Jan. 1943. (14).1.18 75/23396, AGA.

2. *'We Have Been Duped': the Real Working and Living Conditions of Spanish Workers in the 'German Eldorado'.*

The propaganda of the Falange presented the Third Reich as a social Eldorado. But this idealized vision is largely contradicted by the archives which reveal, at times, very serious malfunctions in the volunteer program. One must acknowledge, in the employers' defence, that a sizeable part of the Spanish workforce did not seem to be particularly competent or eager to work. This question was considered as a matter of concern by several actors present in Germany at the time who specifically evoke it in their personal correspondence with Franco⁶⁷. The CIPETA itself conceded that the Spanish authorities had not always been very rigorous in verifying the accuracy of the information given by the volunteers when they were hired. Some were not suited for the work they were hired for, others were cripples or war invalids⁶⁸. Others still were „professional malingerers or vagabonds“ who did not present themselves for work, sold their work clothes to gamble, stole from their workshops and sold their plunder on the black market...⁶⁹

If the businessmen who chose to hire Spanish workers did not always find their eagerness to work satisfactory, numerous documents testify that the workers often had reasons to be disgruntled as well. The issues most frequently evoked had to do with food, working conditions and the growing threat of allied bombardments. In January 1943 the workers of the IG Farben plant in Ludwigshafen claimed that they were treated no differently than „Croatian workers and citizens of other semi-captive nations“. They also complained that, day after day, they had to eat boiled potatoes and salad, the dressing of which „was always prepared according to German taste, which [they] couldn't stand anymore“⁷⁰. In other firms, inspections conducted by the Spanish government revealed appalling working and living conditions. In the beginning of 1942, an inspector reported that the Flettner firm of Berlin let

⁶⁷ We are referring to several documents found in the archives of the National Francisco Franco Foundation: documents dated 2 May 1942 (reference 27197), 7 Nov. 1941 (reference 24375), 6 Sep. 1941 (reference 27013), 5 Sep. 1942 (reference 27148) and 2 May 1942 (reference 27197).

⁶⁸ Letter from Rafael de la Fuente to Marcelo Catalá, 27 Jan. 1942. (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA

⁶⁹ Report of an inspection ..., *ibid.*

⁷⁰ Special Delegation in Berlin, 19 Jan. 1943, (14).1.18 75/23396, AGA.

the workers starve to death⁷¹. What's more, it was quite frequent for these volunteer workers to be given very low skilled tasks (as unskilled laborers, masons or miners)⁷². In a mine in Lorraine, near Metz, all the volunteers were sent down the mineshaft regardless of their stated professions. In this case as in many others, the worker's judgment was unanimous: „we have been duped“.

3. Explaining these Inconsistent Transfers: Shifting Ideological Affinities.

According to the sources this paper is based on, it is quite difficult to find tangible proof that specifically Nazi policies or German models were indeed imported on the Iberian Peninsula. Existing research sometimes tentatively makes this claim but does not always prove it satisfactorily. For example, María Beatriz Delgado Bueno asserts – without supporting her claim – that the Feminine Social Services were set up by the Falange after one of its members had travelled to Germany⁷³. Ángela Cenarro Lagunas is more convincing when she demonstrates that Javier Martínez de Bedoya, one of the founders of the Auxilio Social, was eager to emulate the *Winterhilfe* after having spent one year in Heidelberg as a law student. This Falangist charity organisation indeed reproduced the basic features of the *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* (NSV). Nevertheless, its founding members had to take into account that the inherited political context in Spain was different since the Falange had been a tiny and marginalized organisation in the first half of the 30's⁷⁴. This study agrees with Ángela Cenarro's emphasis on the domestic situation of Spain and on issues specific to the Francoist camp while considering that they are limiting factors in the massive and systematic transfer of social policies between Spain and Germany.

After three years of a bloody conflict that had torn the nation apart and even before the „New State“ adopted the autarkic economic policy that would have such disastrous consequences for its population, the financial means necessary to launch ambitious policy changes were lacking in most fields. This stark financial reality had consequences on social

⁷¹ Report of an inspection ... (14)001/018, 75/23397, *ibid*.

⁷² José Luis RODRÍGUEZ JIMÉNEZ, *Los esclavos españoles de Hitler*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁷³ María Beatriz DELGADO BUENO, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Ángela CENARRO LAGUNAS, *La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra*, Barcelona, Crítica, 2006, pp. 42-6.

policies in general and on the CIPETA in particular. In the early months of 1942, the human and material means at the disposal of the Special Delegation in Berlin were conspicuously insufficient. For instance, the Delegation did not even have a typewriter⁷⁵. One might even argue that, at the time, the CIPETA simply did not have access to the resources it needed to accomplish the most basic aspects of the mission it was mandated to undertake. Even if scores of workers of the Peninsula had expressed the desire to „integrate the Reich“s economy“, no convoy for Germany was chartered after December 1941⁷⁶. However, the fact that the Spanish administration was notoriously underfunded did not explain everything. One should also take into account Franco“s obvious lack of political will who was loath to loose workers which would be vital for the reconstruction of the country. The Caudillo therefore seems to have preferred to answer favourably to the request of the Allies who encouraged him to limit his cooperation with the Reich to the minimum. Thus the desire to placate the dominant power of the time seems to have trumped any ideological affinities with Nazi Germany.

Spain“s surprisingly modest contribution to the war efforts of a „friendly“ nation can also be explained by internal factors. The „New State“ was indeed characterized both by its ideological weakness and its constantly shifting political allegiances given that General Franco was careful not to favour any given faction within his own divided camp. Amongst these factions, the Falange was the one which turned the most enthusiastically and readily towards Nazi Germany: but, at best, it represented an exception that confirmed the rule. The under-secretary of the Ministry of Labor, Escario, a dedicated Falangist, was for example convinced that sending volunteers to Germany would allow to re-educate these men who had supposedly spent „three years under the tyranny of the Reds“ by allowing them to discover, first-hand, the national-socialist view of the world and way of life⁷⁷. The hatred of communism indubitably represented a point of ideological convergence between the Nazi and Francoist regimes. This was made particularly clear in 1942, when an inspector sent by CIPETA to the camps in Lorraine deprecated these „Spanish and Italian communists“ who had painted the sickle and hammer on the barrack walls. He thus advocated organizing a

⁷⁵ Confidential report, 2 Jan. 1942. (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA.

⁷⁶ Arrangement adopted by the CIPETA during the meeting which took place on 26 Feb. 1942. (14)001/018, 75/23396, *ibid.*

⁷⁷ Document dated 3 Mar. 1939, *Deutsch-span. Vereinbarung betr. Arbeitnehmer*, 647. PA AA.

systematic purge to distinguish the „good“ from the „bad Reds“ and encouraged the German police to send the latter back to Spain to be judged⁷⁸.

That being said, certain aspects of Nazi policies raised serious questions even within the Falange. In May 1938, a member of the Feminine Section indicated, in the account of her trip to Germany, that even if she had enjoyed her visits of schools, camping grounds and factories: „never have I forgotten that this organisation cannot be a model for us and that, in our homeland, it will always have to adapt to our very Spanish way of doing things.“⁷⁹ Even Pilar Primo de Rivera cautioned those who returned from these trips to „borrow what [could] be borrowed“⁸⁰ suggesting that certain ideological aspects of Nazi policy had to be firmly rejected. Indeed, if she seemed to admire sincerely the organisation, discipline and level of qualification found in German society, she nevertheless felt less close ideologically to the Nazis than to Italian Fascists⁸¹. For example, Nazi eugenics were considered with suspicion: in September 1937, the German ambassador to the Francoist camp evoked to his superiors the disapproval with which many Spaniards, notably Catholics, regarded the adoption, on 14 July 1933, of a law relative to eugenically motivated sterilizations⁸². More fundamentally, the „delicate question“ of Catholicism was at the root of numerous diplomatic crises with Nazi Germany. This was for instance the case during one of Pilar Primo de Rivera’s trips to Berlin in the month of July 1938. Having expressed the desire to attend mass the day following her arrival, the „young and very Catholic Spanish maiden“ had been driven by her chauffeur to a Protestant Temple rather than to a Catholic Church. What’s more, during a cultural visit, one of the guides had insisted on the beauty of a classical statue of a naked man in a manner that the Falangist leader had deemed „indecent“⁸³. This example illustrates that, even within the Falange, Catholic morality and doctrine exerted such considerable influence that it mitigated the influence of the Nazi model in Spain and reinforced, by contrast, the appeal of Fascist

⁷⁸ Confidential report dated 2 Jan. 1942. (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA.

⁷⁹ “Spanish Women Organizations in Germany”, *Y*, n°4, May 1938.

⁸⁰ María Beatriz DELGADO BUENO, *op. cit.*

⁸¹ Karine BERGES, « La Section féminine de la Phalange à l’épreuve des réalités transnationales du régime franquiste », *art cit.*, 7.

⁸² Letter sent by Heberlein on 13 Sep. 1937. 759, Sa.20b, PA AA.

⁸³ Notes drafted by Deiters, 4 Jul. 1938. 759, Sa.20 c, *ibid.*

Italy and Salazar's authoritarian regime in Portugal⁸⁴. In its propaganda the Falange for instance foregrounded the „social-Christian spirit“ of the Francoist regime by explicitly evoking the Fascist *Carta del Lavoro*. Whereas Pilar Primo de Rivera, after having travelled to Portugal and having met representatives of the *Mocidades Femeninas Portugueses*, expressed her satisfaction at having discovered that Spain shared with this close neighbour „a similarly ambitious eagerness to save Christian civilization“⁸⁵.

Conclusion

With the progressive loss of influence of the Falange after the 1940s, the interest for the German social model dwindled further after the end of the Second World War. At the same time, Spain was also starting to be exiled from the international stage. The regime was thus mired in an autarkic attitude which contributed to cut it off even more clearly from all international research networks in social policy. One can therefore consider that the exchanges between the New Francoist State and Nazi Germany culminated between 1942 and 1943, before becoming less intense for both external and internal reasons. This paper thus tends to confirm the findings of other researchers notably in the fields of medicine and public health which come up with very similar chronologies⁸⁶. It also illustrates the fact that in order to properly understand the extent and mechanics of these transfers, historians also need to consider this process from the bottom-up by taking into account the ambivalent way in which the actors perceived these public policies. If Spanish volunteer workers might have been considered by some as embodying concretely a form of „Fascist internationalism“ the study of archival material suggests that, as far as labor policy was concerned, it did not exist either at the inter-governmental or the personal level. The same year as the inspector deplored the Communist sympathies of some of the workers sent to Germany, in the Austrian towns of Linz and Steyr, a group of volunteers was called „fascist pigs“, the Spanish flag which was

⁸⁴ María Antonia FERNÁNDEZ JIMÉNEZ, *Pilar Primo de Rivera: el falangismo femenino*, Madrid, Síntesis, 2008, p. 202.

⁸⁵ Antonio MORANT I ARIÑO, “Estado totalitario y género: el referente alemán para la Sección Femenina de Falange, 1936-1945”, *Alcores: revista de historia contemporánea*, 2012, n° 13, pp. 77-8.

⁸⁶ D. BRYDAN, “Axis Internationalism”, *art cit.*, p. 292.

torn off their work clothes and they were threatened with death by Austrians who repeated „*nicht España*“ and „*nicht Franco*“; while the wardens of the camp merely looked on⁸⁷.

Correlatively, focusing on this „micro“ scale allowed us to emphasize the complex impact national circumstances had on these global transfers: in the case of Spain, the power-struggle opposing the Falange to the INP is particularly significant to understand the contradictory forces at work within the regime. After the end of the Second World War, Luis Jordana de Pozas, the director of the INP, went to London to observe first-hand the social reforms being undertaken in the United Kingdom. In the hope of bolstering his own project of establishing a unified welfare system, he organized a series of conferences of William Beveridge in Spain⁸⁸. Even if the Briton spoke several times at the Central University of Madrid between the end of March and the beginning of April 1946, none of the key figures of the Ministry of Labor attended his talks nor did the Falangist Girón de Velasco. If Beveridge tended to minimize the political implications of his trip, he did take the time to detail his understanding of a „free society“ during one of his conferences: significantly this foray was censured by the official press but was mentioned in the *Boletín de Información del INP*. After having returned to London, Beveridge published in *The Observer* an interview entitled „How to get rid of Franco?“ which generated considerable attention on the peninsula. Spanish hopes to be quickly readmitted on the international stage after the War will thus remain fruitless for years to come: however ambivalent they might have been, the regime“s relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy established in 1936, will be a difficult stain to erase.

⁸⁷ Report of an inspection... (14)001/018, 75/23397, AGA.

⁸⁸ The following information on this trip are drawn from A. ÁLVAREZ ROSETE, ““¡Bienvenido, Mister Beveridge!” El viaje de William Beveridge a España y la Previsión Social Franquista”, *art cit.*